Three-Team Rotation Model

How the Three-Team Model Works

This proposal is for three teams of former U.S. Special Operations veterans to sequentially deploy and operate in Ukraine in concert with Ukrainian Special Forces Command (SSO).
1:
Forward Operational Exposure in Ukraine

One team operates in Ukraine alongside Ukrainian Special Forces Command, gaining direct exposure to the most advanced drone warfare battlefield currently in existence.

2:
U.S.-Based Training and Instruction

A second team is positioned in the United States to transform frontline lessons into training delivery, tactical instruction, and operationally relevant education for U.S. defense and security stakeholders.

3:
Review, Refinement, and Redeployment Preparation

A third team conducts structured review, extracts insights, updates training materials, refines methodologies, and prepares to re-enter the cycle.

Rotating quarterly, these teams create a persistent loop between combat experience and institutional learning — allowing U.S. readiness to evolve at a tempo far closer to the battlefield itself.

Why This Matters Now

Ukraine Is the Most Valuable Operational Learning Environment in Modern Warfare

Ukraine is the clearest example of the state of modern warfare: expendable AI-assisted drones, electronic warfare, rapid adaptation, and mass production of drones. Ukraine is living and learning drone warfare — at scale, giving those operating in Ukraine the most advanced real-world drone warfare experience in existence.

The United States cannot afford to fall any further behind China in drone warfare practices. The U.S. should embrace the lessons from Ukraine. We propose a structured U.S.-Ukraine training partnership built around rotational, real-time extraction of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and ultimately the establishment of a drone warfare schoolhouse.

Drone warfare evolves monthly

In a battlespace defined by rapid adaptation and constant change, the United States must capture these capabilities in real time to strengthen national preparedness.

The U.S. Is Still Training for Yesterday’s Threat

The danger is not technological inferiority alone. It is doctrinal and institutional mismatch.

U.S.–Ukraine Training Partnership

This program translates combat lessons into U.S.-relevant training modules while maintaining a continuous feedback loop between battlefield experience and instruction.

The goal is simple: Institutionalize in the United States what is being learned in Ukraine before it must be relearned at far greater cost. The program will operate under clear, transparent governance focused on measurable results and rapid improvement.

How the Program Works

From Combat Experience to Institutional Capability

This initiative functions as a live adaptation pipeline rather than a fixed curriculum. It is designed to move emerging battlefield realities into usable American capability with speed and discipline.

Step 1

Battlefield immersion in Ukraine under real operational conditions

Step 2

Extraction of tactical and technical lessons as they emerge

Step 3

Translation into U.S.-relevant modules for training and force development

Step 4

Delivery to operational audiences across military and security institutions

Step 5

Continuous refinement through recurring rotation and structured feedback

In practical terms, this means shortening the distance between what is learned under fire and what is taught, practiced, and institutionalized at home.

Why This Matters Now

Built for a Wide Range of U.S. End Users

While anchored in special operations relevance, this program is built for broader national application. Its lessons are immediately valuable to institutions responsible for preparing against drone-enabled threats, contested operational environments, and rapidly changing tactical realities.
U.S. Special Operations Forces
In a battlespace defined by rapid adaptation and constant change, the United States must capture these capabilities in real time to strengthen national preparedness.
Conventional Military Forces
Scalable training and doctrine inputs for force-wide modernization and collective task development.
Homeland Security
Improved preparedness for drone-enabled risks to domestic environments, infrastructure, and response architecture.
Homeland Defense
Relevant lessons for defending critical systems and territory against mass unmanned threats.
Law Enforcement
Operational understanding of drone threats, civilian-area response requirements, and cross-agency coordination challenges.

Strategic Return on Investment

A High-Leverage Modernization Investment

For approximately $25 million annually, the United States gains:
  • complete strategic and tactical drone interoperability training;
  • continuous battlefield observation assets;
  • institutionalized adaptation cycle;
  • SOF-focused drone integration capability;
  • near real-time EW survival doctrine updates, and;
  • scalable training across CONUS.

This proposal represents a low-cost, high-impact modernization accelerator. Failure to institutionalize these lessons risks multi-billion-dollar capability gaps and large-scale military and civilian losses in future conflicts. We further propose in-house analysis on collected reports for the purpose of recommendations for official changes to U.S. military doctrine.

This proposal represents a low-cost, high-impact modernization accelerator. Failure to institutionalize these lessons risks multi-billion-dollar capability gaps and large-scale military and civilian losses in future conflicts. We further propose in-house analysis on collected reports for the purpose of recommendations for official changes to U.S. military doctrine.

By defense standards, this is a modest investment. By strategic standards, it is a decisive one.

Capture the Lessons of Modern Drone Warfare Before the Next Conflict Demands Them

Ukraine is generating the most important combat lessons in drone warfare available anywhere in the world today. The United States has a narrow opportunity to transform those lessons into readiness, adaptation, and doctrine before strategic surprise turns institutional delay into operational cost.

This proposal creates that mechanism.

The question is no longer whether drone-centric warfare will define future conflict. The question is whether the United States will act early enough to prepare for it on the terms reality has already set.